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Abstract
In the commons, communities whose growth depends on public goods, individuals often rely on surpris-
ingly simple strategies, or heuristics, to decide whether to contribute to the common good (at risk of
exploitation by free-riders). Although this appears a limitation, here we show how four heuristics lead to
sustainable growth by exploiting specific environmental constraints. The two simplest ones –contribute
permanently or switch stochastically between contributing or not– are first shown to bring sustainability
when the public good efficiently promotes growth. If efficiency declines and the commons is structured
in small groups, the most effective strategy resides in contributing only when a majority of individuals
are also contributors. In contrast, when group size becomes large, the most effective behavior follows a
minimal-effort rule: contribute only when it is strictly necessary. Both plastic strategies are observed in
natural systems what presents them as fundamental social motifs to successfully manage sustainability.
2Introduction
In many biological, social and economic systems, there exists a continuous interplay between individual
actions and collective dynamics [1–3]. This interplay becomes particularly significant when the individual
decisions on how to contribute to a public resource determine in the end the sustainability of the whole.
The choice of contributing –that implies personal costs– favors community growth but also promotes the
appearance of free-riders. These agents take advantage of the public good (PG), spread in the population
and eventually bring its collapse [4].
This predicted scenario does not correspond however with many observations. Stable communities
whose growth is based on PGs are indeed observed at all scales; from microbial aggregates, e.g., biofilms
depending on the individual contribution of extracellular substances, e.g., [5,6], to human commons, e.g.,
fisheries, forests, etc (note that in some of these cases the choice is not so much to contribute but to make
appropriate use of a shared resource) [7, 8]. These findings triggered the interest on understanding the
type of behavioral strategies that could be adopted by individuals to help avoid collapse and how such
outcome could further depend on specific structural features characterizing the community.
Notably, the adoption of simple strategies appears to be efficient enough to promote sustainabil-
ity [6, 15]. Simple rules contrast the idea of elaborated behaviors that allow individuals to optimally
maximize benefits, a null model particularly extended in studies of human commons. In this context,
the relevance of elementary strategies (or heuristics) was first investigated by Herbert Simon that also
pioneered the essential connection between heuristics and the particular environment where they are to
be applied [9] (see also [10–12]). In a broader perspective, heuristics – sometimes interpreted as behav-
ioral “limitations”– can then represent effective strategies to deal with complex ecological constraints –a
consideration that applies to bacterial, animal and human decision-making circumstances [6, 7, 13–15].
In this manuscript, we examine how simple strategies, that exhibit limited information processing,
can nevertheless be adjusted to exploit certain environmental constraints to attain sustainable growth.
We model the commons by means of a stylized ecological public-good model in which a population of
agents is organized in groups (where they are involved in a public-good game) and the supply of PG
determines population density [16] (Fig. S1). Core structural factors characterizing the “community”
can also be modified in the model, such as group size N or resource characteristics, i.e., PG efficiency, r.
We additionally consider three types of individual strategies of increasing sophistication (Fig. 1).
3First, we examine the validity of the simplest one, i.e., permanent production of PG. We find that this
strategy works when PG creation efficiently induces growth and the commons is structured in relatively
small groups. Then, we assume a strategy that stochastically alternates between contribution and non-
contribution. This rule, as simple as it is, enlarges the range of commons where its adoption leads to
sustainability (as compared to the previous case). Finally, we introduce a heuristic in which a simple
sensing mechanism is at work. This sensing allows individuals to condition their contribution on the
composition of their last interaction group, i.e., it involves some degree of behavioral plasticity. We
discover two opposite plastic heuristics to be efficient in two contrasting environmental situations. While
positive plasticity (contribute only when most individuals in the group are contributing) works for low
efficiency and small groups, negative plasticity (contribute merely when it is strictly necessary) does it
for high efficiency and large groups.
Results
Constitutive Production and the Risks of the Commons
We first examined the consequences of the simplest possible strategy: permanent and indiscriminate
production of PG. This strategy maximizes growth but additionally favors the emergence of cheaters
(that arise by mutation from an allP population). Cheaters rapidly invade a resident population but also
cause its decline, because of the coupled decay in PG (less P s) that limits growth (Fig. 2A).
The population cascade associated to cheater expansion can unexpectedly direct to its recovery. This
is linked to the group structure of the interactions in the commons. Sufficiently small density causes the
appearance of groups primarily composed of only P s or only cheaters (Figs. 2A-B) that multiplies the
replication of constitutive P and reduces that of cheaters, both processes contributing to the recovery
of the population (when enough inter-group composition variance is generated, in what is known as the
Simpson’s paradox [16, 17], see also Supplement).
This recovery dynamics includes however an added risk, since the low density could precipitate pop-
ulation extinction by stochastic demographic effects [18], Figs. 2A and 2C. Risk is raised when the
population repeatedly exhibits critical cascades, i.e., declines in density below a particular minimal value.
The final outcome between recovery and extinction is strongly determined by the intrinsic properties of
the commons. Constitutive production reveals in this way as a successful strategy when the PG efficiently
4determines growth (r sufficiently high, Figs. 2D-F ) or when groups within the commons are relatively
small (controlling for r, Fig. S2).
Stochastic Production Can Reduce the Risks
We analyzed a second strategy in which individuals choose randomly whether to contribute or not to the
PG (i.e., they can sometimes decide to free ride). Specifically, agents present a nP state with probability
q> (or, conversely, an P state with 1-q>, see Fig. 1). Therefore, stochastic producers are totally unable
to sense the composition of their interaction group (the amount of available PG).
A homogeneous population of stochastic producers generates a constant sub-population of nP s that
decreases PG levels with two consequences. It can reduce the chances of cheaters to replicate (which
favors sustainability) but also drive the system to extinction even without any cheater present –by cause
of a severe PG reduction. We quantified this trade-off by computing the number of critical cascades,
as before, and their duration (i.e., number of consecutive steps below the minimal density threshold).
Increasing q> reduces the number of critical cascades but also increases steadily cascade duration (that
reflects the delay in the appearance of allP groups associated to population recovery).
This trade-off indicates an optimal q> that minimizes the frequency of extinctions and defines the
exact stochastic rate for a successful strategy (Figs. 3.A-B). When agents follow this optimal stochas-
tic heuristic, cheater replication is limited event for high densities (generally below 50%, Figs. 3C-D),
population oscillations are damped, and extinction risks reduced. This dynamics contrasts with the con-
stitutive heuristics scenario in which cheater replication can reach very high values in dense populations
(Fig. S3).
Sustainability is thus attained in a wider range of commons (in terms of r andN) when agents followed
a stochastic strategy. However, this range is still limited. A relative decrease in r (Fig. S4) or an increase
in N (Fig. S5) implies once more an increment in the number of critical cascades and in this way of
extinctions. Alternative strategies are required in those commons.
Plastic Cooperation Favors Sustainable Growth
To analyze if the addition of some basic information-processing features could direct to more effective
heuristics (in commons where growth is unsustainable with the use of constitutive or stochastic pro-
duction) we examined a third strategy that includes a simple sensing mechanism. This sensing permits
5agents evaluate the relative abundance of P s in the group where they most recently played the game
(this can be estimated by means of the amount of PG received).
If the PG obtained in the previous interaction is above (below) a particular threshold θ, individuals
exhibit the nP phenotype with probability q> (q<). This defines a general plastic producer, see Fig. 1. We
studied then the dynamics of a population of individuals exhibiting different plastic heuristics (distinct
q>, q<, θ) in a range of commons (characterized by r and N). By scanning the diverse heuristic/commons
conditions, we were able to identify two specific plastic heuristics that leads to sustainable growth in wider
range of commons.
Positive Plasticity is the Most Effective Strategy for Small Groups and Low Efficiency
The most valuable heuristic in commons characterized by small groups and low PG efficiency r consists on
contributing to PG only if most members of the agent’s recent interaction group were also contributing.
Individuals that follow this heuristic (positive plastic producers) immediately react to the presence of nP
(or cheaters) in their past interaction, becoming nP themselves (formally, they present a small q>, but a
large q< and θ, see Fig. 1). The appearance of cheaters in a population of positive plastic producers (in
state P ) originates consequently an immediate decrease of PG in each group which triggers the remaining
P s to stop contributing and switch to nP (Fig. 4A).
As population declines, the number of groups exclusively formed by the residual plastic individuals in
the P state increase (shading in Figs. 4A-B). This situation drives the system to the “recovery regime”
where inter-group variance makes the Simpson’s paradox decisive once more (Fig. 4D). Note that this
recovery dynamics, characteristic of the structure of commons, is enhanced by the heuristic at work:
P individuals that experienced groups of only P s keep contributing with high probability. The whole
process stops the creation of nP s, expels cheaters and takes the population back to an allP regime, an
absorbing state of the system (Fig. 4.B). Once the population is uniquely constituted by P s, it remains
in this homogeneous state until new cheaters arise.
If groups are relatively large, the mechanisms just described fail. While the reaction to cheater invasion
is similar, the enrichment of allP groups is delayed. Only when the population level becomes very low,
these groups start to arise but, as we discussed earlier, this regime increases the chance of demographic
extinctions. These collapses are not totally avoided in commons displaying higher r. In these cases,
large group size N and large efficiency r, we identified an alternative plastic heuristic that can assist
6sustainable growth.
Negative Plasticity is the Most Effective Strategy for Large Groups and High Efficiency
Individuals following a minimal-effort (plastic) heuristic are the ones that most strongly bring sustain-
ability in commons structured in large groups, and where the supply of PG efficiently determines growth.
These negative plastic producers present a nP state unless the amount of PG in their latter interaction
group is below a minimal threshold that could in the end impede growth (formally, they exhibit a large
q>, but small q< and θ, see Fig. 1). Thus, a population constituted by negative plastic producers is
constantly at low density, independently of the presence of cheaters.
The low-density regime is maintained as a dynamical equilibrium in which an excess of P s makes
individuals to become nP , since many P s are observed in each group, while the successive lack of PG
(and of P s in the groups) is compensated by showing again the P state. In this scenario, the emergence
of cheaters by mutation is indirectly controlled by the high abundance of nP already in the resident
population, which reduces in turn cheater presence and chance of invasion (Fig. 4C).
As negative plasticity strongly relies on the abundance (by default) of nP agents, this heuristic
requires that the PG produced by those that contribute must transform very efficiently into growth. For
this reason, negative plasticity is successful only when r is above a certain minimal value. Note also that,
as compared to a population of positive plastic producers, the mechanisms of recovery do not rely so
much on the temporal increase of inter-group variance (that brings the “recovery regime”) but on the
presence of a relatively constant and adequate inter-group diversity (Fig. 4D).
Discussion
Communities whose growth depends on a PG contributed by their members present a fundamental insta-
bility associated to the emergence of free-riders (cheaters) that do not contribute but use the accessible
PG. This instability –at its core a problem of maintenance of cooperation– produces direct ecological
consequences, i.e., the collapse of the population.
This ecological scenario immediately defines a characteristic “environment” in which individuals fol-
lowing simple strategies are to “solve” a precise task: attaining the sustainable growth of the collective.
We analyzed this situation by considering limitations upon the decision-making capacities (Fig. 1) and
7also modifications of the specific attributes of the environment (r and N) where decisions are taken [9].
The analysis of the simplest heuristic, constitutive production of PG, reveals the core ecological dy-
namics (Fig. 2A) [16]. By avoiding production costs, cheaters can spread in a population of (constitutive)
P s consequently reducing population density due to PG depletion. The resultant low densities induce
the formation of between-group differences (groups dominantly constituted by P s or cheaters, Figs. 2B-
C). This high inter-group variance causes individuals in groups dominantly composed by P s to receive
larger payoffs, i.e., present higher replication rates. Differential growth leads to population recovery, as
P agents are the ones strongly contributing to the next generations (Simpson’s paradox [17], Fig. 2A-B).
Low densities help then to promote P s (i.e., cooperation) in such structured populations.
Low densities originate a complementary ecological effect, when populations undergo demographic
extinctions [18] instead of recovery. We captured these processes by quantifying the number of critical
cascades –the number of times that the population is below a minimal density threshold. A decrease in
r or an increase of N increases the number of critical cascades and the frequency of extinctions if PG
is constitutively generated (Fig. 2D and Fig. S2). Hence, permanent production of PG does not always
drive sustainable growth.
We introduced two additional heuristics. The simplest one, in which no external information is
processed, consists in switching stochastically between contribution and non-contribution, i.e., individuals
decide randomly to free-ride. This behaviour (defined by an opportune optimal switching rate, Fig. 3A-
B) is generally more effective than constitutive production, but fails again when r becomes smaller or N
larger (Figs. S4 and S5).
The third heuristic is based on conditional contribution. We implement this by means of a simple
sensing mechanism that allows individuals to estimate the composition of their recent interaction group
and alter their behaviour accordingly. Modifying the two key structural attributes of the commons let us
identify two contrasting conditional strategies.
For low r (and sufficiently small group size N) positive plasticity is the most convenient strategy
(Fig. 5A). This is related to its highly reactive response to cheaters. In fact, positive plastic producers
stop producing PG when few cheaters (or few nP s) are detected in their earlier interaction group. This
response immediately directs to minimal densities (Fig. 4A) and a successive strong recovery to the
population carrying capacity (Fig. 4B). Interestingly, the reaction to cheaters invasions (consisting in
the rapid increase of nP s) is promptly interrupted as result of the feedback between the threshold-like
8decision and group assortment of P s (created by the combination of low density and small group size,
Fig. 4A). This example emphasizes how heuristics associated to limited information processing (the
limitation corresponds in this case to the inability of individuals to distinguish the presence of cheaters
from that of plastic producers in the nP state) are still efficient due to the specific ecological structure
where they are applied [9–12].
Positive plasticity does not work when the commons is structured in large groups. In this case,
negative plasticity emerges comparatively as a better strategy (Fig. 5B). This minimal effort behavior [19]
maintains the population in a dynamical equilibrium with the largest possible frequency of nP s that
minimizes cheaters advantage but is compatible with population growth. Negative plasticity is in this
sense an advanced version of stochastic production with the individual ability to switch back to a P state
when population density reaches critical values.
Thus, the use of different decision-making strategies clearly causes divergent sustainability outcomes
when controlling for community structure (i.e, when both N and r is fixed, Fig. 5). One could further
ask if these strategies are observed in natural scenarios (characterized by a PG dilemma). We suggest
that this is the case. Indeed, phenotypic noise, similar to the stochastic production strategy, is present
in many bacterial communities, as a broad form of bet hedging [20] or in the stochastic expression of
virulence factors, e.g., [21]. Moreover, production of PGs such as extracellular polymeric substances
–fundamental for biofilm communities– is activated/terminated at high cell densities [5, 6]; expression of
bacteriocins is reduced when the population density is low by a quorum-sensing system [22]; generation
of iron-scavenging pyoverdin molecules –iron being an essential public good in some environments– is
reduced when enough molecules are already present minimizing the ability of cheaters to invade [23]. In a
different scale, that of human commons, various forms of conditional cooperation were also observed, with
a variable degree of individual investment linked to group size [15, 24] (predicting minimal collaborative
efforts in collective action as group size increases [25], reminiscent of our results on negative plasticity;
see also the “hump shaped” strategies in [26]).
That all the situations above correspond to very separate scenarios indicates that these heuristics could
be fundamental “building blocks” [7] in the assembly of this type of social arenas and, more broadly, in
the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations (see Supplement for an extended discussion).
Overall, these findings stress that, beyond the importance of structural factors, like PG efficiency and
group structure, the sustainability of the commons should be understood as the appropriate integration
9of ecological dynamics and individual information-processing abilities.
Methods
Public Good Games
Public good games are used to model social dilemmas in which the optimal behavior of the individual
conflicts with the best outcome of the collective [3]. The simplest of these models is the one-shot public
good game (also termed N -person prisoner’s dilemma [27]). This game is played by agents that can
contribute (cooperators or producers, P ) or not (defectors or non-producers, nP ) to the PG in groups
of size N . Contributing implies a cost c to the agents. After the game, all contributions are summed,
multiplied by an efficiency, or reward, factor r (that determines the efficiency of the investments and the
attractiveness of the PG) and redistributed to all individuals within the group, irrespectively of their
contribution. Thus, if there are i cooperators among the N participants, the payoff for a defector is
icr/N while the payoff for a cooperator is icr/N - c.
Computational Model
We used an agent-based computational model characterized by two distinct stages (Fig. S1). In stage I,
the population is structured in evenly-sized randomly formed groups in which the PG game is played. In
stage II, after groups disappear, each individual chooses its successive phenotype (and then replicates)
according to the group composition (and payoff) experienced in stage I. This model extends the original
Hamilton’s group selection model [28] to one in which individuals are able to dynamically change their
phenotype according to previous experience.
Note that the PG game is specifically characterized by the parameters N , r, and c (group size,
efficiency and cost of the PG, respectively). We fix c=1 and r<N (this second condition defines produc-
ers/cooperators as strong altruists [29]) and also the conditions of the initial population (constituted by
a common pool of k identical plastic agents in the P state; k is thus the maximal population size). The
system is updated in a sequential way as follows (Supplement for further details): 1. The common pool is
divided in randomly formed groups of size N (groups may contain individuals and empty spaces). 2. In
each one of the (non-empty) groups, a one-shot PG game is played. Agents in the nP state and cheaters
receive the payoff PnP = i c r/(i + j + w), while agents in the P state receive the same payoff minus a
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cost, i.e., PP =PnP − c; with i, j, w being the number of P s, nP s and cheaters in the group, respectively,
and i+ j + w ≤ N . After the interaction the grouping of individuals is dissolved. 3. Each plastic agent
adjusts its state according to the relative abundance of P s that experienced in the group where it played
the game and the triplet (q>, q<, θ) as described in Fig. 1. 4. Each individual replicates (creating an
offspring) with a probability that is calculated by dividing its payoff by the maximal possible one (i.e.,
the payoff obtained by a nP , or equivalently a cheater, in a group of N -1 P s). Replication happens when
the current total population presents less than k individuals (i.e., there exits empty space). For each
replication, an individual generates an offspring that is a cheater with probability ν (i.e., a constitutive
nP , see Fig. 1). 5. Individuals are removed with probability δ (death rate).
References
1. Levin, S. A. Fragile dominion: complexity and the commons. Perseus, Mass (1999).
2. Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. Consensus decision making in animals. Trends Ecol. Evol 20, 449–456
(2005).
3. Kagel, J. H., & Roth, A. E. eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton Univ Press,
NJ (1995).
4. Hardin, G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243–1248 (1968).
5. Diggle, S., Griffin, A., Campbell, G. & West, S. A Cooperation and conflict in quorum-sensing
bacterial populations. Nature 450, 411–414 (2007).
6. Nadell, C. D., Xavier, J. B., Levin, S. A. & Foster, K.R. The evolution of quorum sensing in bacterial
biofilms. PLoS Biol. 6, 171–179 (2008).
7. Ostrom, E. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton Univ Press, NJ (2005).
8. Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. A cooperative species–Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton Univ
Press, NJ (2011).
9. Simon, H. Rational choice and the structure of the environment, in Models of man. J. Wiley Ed.,
New York (1957).
11
10. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. H. & Walker, J. Rules, games and common pool resources. University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mi (1994).
11. Gigerenzer, G., & Selten R. eds., Bounded rationality–the adaptive toolbox. MIT press, Cambridge,
Mass (2001).
12. Gigerenzer, G. & Gaissmaier, W. Heuristic decision making. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 62, 451–482
(2011).
13. Marsh, B. Do animals use heuristics? Journal of Bioeconomics, 4, 49–56 (2002)
14. Agrawal, A. Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources. World Dev.
29, 1649–1672 (2001).
15. Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld,M. Conditional cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Suc-
cess in Forest Commons Management. Science 330, 961–965 (2010).
16. Hauert, C. , Holmes, M. & Doebeli, M. Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance
of cooperation in public goods games. Proc. Biolog. Sci. B 273, 3131–3132 (2006).
17. Sober, E. The Nature of Selection. Univ. Chicago Press, Il (1984).
18. Melbourne, B. A. & Hastings, A. Extinction risk depends strongly on factors contributing to stochas-
ticity. Nature 454, 100–103 (2008).
19. Zipf, G. K. Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. Addison-Wesley (1949).
20. Beaumont, H. J .E., Gallie, J., Kost, C., Ferguson, G.C. & Rainey, P.B. Experimental evolution of
bet hedging. Nature 462, 90–93 (2009).
21. Ackermann, M., Stecher, B., Freed, N. E., Songhet, P., Hardt, W-D. & Doebeli, M. Self-destructive
cooperation mediated by phenotypic noise. Nature 454, 987–990 (2008).
22. van der Ploeg, J. R. Regulation of bacteriocin production in Streptococcus mutans by the quorum-
sensing system required for development of genetic competence. J. Bacteriol. 187, 3980–3989 (2005).
23. Ku¨mmerli, R. & Brown, S.PMolecular and regulatory properties of a public good shape the evolution
of cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 18921–18926 (2010).
12
24. Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425, 785–791 (2003).
25. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard Univ Press, Mass (1965).
26. Fischbacher, U., Ga¨chter, S. & Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a
public goods experiment. Econ Letters 71, 397–404 (2001).
27. Archetti, M. & Scheuring, I. Review: Game theory of public-goods in one-shot social dilemmas
without assortment. J. Theor. Biol. 299, 9–20 (2012).
28. Hamilton, W.D. Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics, in R. Fox
(Ed.), Biosocial Anthrophology. Wiley, New York, 133–153 (1975).
29. Fletcher, J.A. & Zwick, M. The evolution of altruism: Game theory in multilevel selection and
inclusive fitness. Journal of Theoretical Biology 245, 26–36(2007).
Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by CSIC “programa junta para la ampliacio´n de estudios” JAEDOC15
(to M.C.) and by Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness BFU2001–24691 grant (to J.F.P.).
Contributions
MC and JFP designed and performed research. Both authors wrote, reviewed and approved the manuscript.
Competing financial interests
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
13
P
B
nPq>
q<
Ch 0 1q
q>
q<
0 1q
q>
q<
negative plasticitypositive plasticityA
P
ro
b
. 
n
P
0
1
P
ro
b
. 
n
P
1
0
#indiv.
#P
#indiv.
#P
Figure 1. Individuals as plastic producers. (A) A plastic producer can contribute (producer state,
P ) or not (non-producer state, nP ) to the PG. This choice is made after each interaction and is
conditioned to the specific group composition experienced, i.e., the ratio between the number of P s and
the total number of individuals in the group. If this ratio is bigger, or equal, than a particular threshold
value θ, an agent becomes nP with probability q> (if the ratio is smaller, it becomes nP with q<).
Cheaters (Ch), i.e., agents that are permanently in the nP state, arise from plastic producers by
mutation. (B) Following this, a constitutive producer corresponds to the case q> = q< = 0, while a
stochastic producer exhibits nonzero q> = q<. Positive plastic producers (left panel) are characterized
by a relatively large θ. This implies that they hardly become nP if the group they experienced was
mostly constituted by P s (as they are also defined by a small q>); if not, they express nP with high
probability (large q<). In contrast, negative plastic producers (right panel) present a fairly small θ. This
means that they express nP with high probability (as they are also defined by a large q>) unless they
were part of groups with few P s, in which case they hardly express nP (small q<). Note that the
number of individuals (#indiv.) can be less or equal than the group size (N).
14
A
time
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
50
100
150
200
250
time
B C
G
ro
u
p
s
time
G
ro
u
p
s
1 2
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
50
100
150
200
250
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
50
100
150
200
250
D E F
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 o
f 
ex
t.
N
u
m
b
er
 c
ri
t.
ca
sc
.
r
40
0
80
120
75 6
0
1
A
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
100
200
time
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
100
200
time
1
2
Figure 2. Growth based on constitutive producers is not sustainable for weakly efficient
public good. (A) Recovery and extinction in a population composed by constitutive P s and cheaters
(color code as in Fig 1; total population in black). (B-C) Each group in the population (squares) is
colored in different blue tones in a recovery (B) [around 1 in (A)] or an extinction (C) [around 2 in (A)]
event. Group composition ranges from all P (dark blue) to all cheaters (light blue); white denotes
empty groups. Note the enrichment of groups with only P immediately after each population decay.
Unsuccessful replication of these initial groups causes population collapse. (D) Frequency of extinctions
(continuous line) and median number of critical cascades (dashed line) as function of r. (E-F)
Characteristic trace of regimes with low (E) and high (F) r. The population crosses more often the
critical density region (highlighted in gray) at low r for an equivalent time window. A critical cascade is
observed when the population crosses the critical density threshold, fixed to 30 (i.e., = k/10). Each
point in (D) is the median (and 25/75% percentiles) of the average number of critical cascades obtained
by considering all simulations that did not go extinct in 1000 independent runs of 6× 105 steps.
Parameters: k = 300, N = 10, ν = 5× 10−6, δ = 0.2, c = 1 (all panels); r = 4 (A-B-C), r = 4.6 (E) and
r = 6.5 (F).
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Figure 3. Stochastic producers can reduce extinctions. (A) Frequency of extinctions as a
function of the probability q> to stochastically express a nP state (q> = q<, see Fig. 1). There exists an
optimal q> that reduces extinctions by decreasing the number of critical cascades (continuous line in B)
trading-off for their duration (dashed line in B). (C-D) Characteristic dynamics of a stochastic producer
with optimal switching rate (q> = 0.55, color code as in Fig 1, black curve denotes total population).
Note the limited replication rate of cheaters (generally below ∼50%) even when population is high.
Cheater advantage is stronger when agents constitutively produce PG (Fig. S3). A critical cascade is
observed when the population crosses the critical density threshold, fixed to 30 (i.e., = k/10), while the
duration of a critical cascade is the average number of consecutive steps the population stays below the
critical density threshold. Each point in (B) is the median (and 25/75% percentiles) obtained by
considering all simulations that do not go extinct in 1000 independent runs with 6× 105 steps.
Parameters: k = 300, N = 10, r = 4, c = 1, δ = 0.2.
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Figure 4. Positive and negative plastic producers include a sensing mechanism. (A) Positive
plastic producers expressing a P state quickly switch to nP as response to cheaters. This causes a fast
reduction of P s overall (arrow thickness in inset cartoons denotes preferred individual decisions
above/below θ with associated probabilities). After cheater invasion is stopped, the population exhibits
coexistence of P and nP to finally evolve to an allP scenario (B). Shading areas in (A-B) denote the
relative amount of groups composed by only P s. (C) A population of negative plastic producers is
characterized by its permanent low density favored by the constant presence of nP which helps
controlling cheaters invasion. (D) Positive plasticity transiently modifies the inter-group variance to
control cheaters and stop the emergence of nP s. This contrasts with the relatively constant variance
observed in a population of negative plastic producers (variances correspond to time series (B) and (C),
respectively). Plastic producer definitions and color code as Fig. 1, with q> = 0, q< = 0.7 and θ = 1 for
positive plasticity and q> = 0.7, q< = 0 and θ = 0.1 for negative; black curve describes total population.
Parameters: k = 300, N = 10, δ = 0.2, c = 1, ν = 5× 10−6 (all panels); r = 2 (A-B) and r = 2.2 (C).
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Figure 5. Individual strategies differentially manage sustainability in the commons.
Extinction frequencies observed by individuals exhibiting constitutive (black), stochastic (blue), and
positive/negative (dark/light green) plasticity in a population structured in small [(A), N=10] or large
[(B), N = 60] groups (as a function of r). We considered 1000 independent runs with 6× 105 steps
(Fig. S8 and S9 considered a different k and longer time series, respectively). For the curves
corresponding to positive, negative plasticity and stochastic producers, the values plotted correspond to
the minimal extinction frequency obtained by considering all possible instances of positive, negative and
stochastic producers, respectively (see Figs. S5–S7 and Supplement for details). Other parameters are
k = 300, c = 1, δ = 0.2, ν = 5× 10−6.
